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Despite widespread interest in Chinas growing trade surplus and its impact
on other countries, empirical research in these issues is handicapped by the lack
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1 Introduction
A recent surge in Chinas exports and trade surplus has spawned a torrent of studies
on their determinants and their implications for other countries. Similarly, controver-
sies surrounding Chinas exchange rate policy have motivated an army of researchers to
estimate the equilibrium value of the Renminbi (RMB) and the potential impact of its
major revaluation on the export competitiveness of China and its trade partners.
Although the empirical assessment of these issues typically requires data on the real
trade values of relevant countries, the Chinese government has begun reporting aggregate
export and import deators only very recently. While researchers often estimate the trade
volumes of China and other countries using a surrogate price index, an inappropriate
deator can signicantly distort econometric analysis. As will be discussed below, this
problem relates closely to the facts that the trade of China and several other East Asian
countries is increasingly concentrated in electronic products whose trading volume and
prices are subject to signicant medium-term uctuations.
The next section discusses this problem in more detail. Section 3 illustrates its quan-
titative importance by examining recent studies on the competitive relationship between
the exports of China and other Asian countries. Section 4 provides a conclusion.
2 The problem
By denition, the aggregate trade volume is the aggregate trade value deated with a
suitably dened aggregate trade price. For example, the export volume (real exports)
of country i in period t is dened as QXi;t = V
X
i;t =P
X
i;t , or in logarithmic terms,
qXi;t = v
X
i;t   pXi;t; (1)
where vXi;t and p
X
i;t are the logs of the aggregate export value and price. There are a number
of formulas for the aggregate price index, which may produce di¤erent time series of pXi;t
and hence also of qXi;t. Although price indices derived from establishment price surveys are
generally superior to unit value indices based on customs statistics, developing countries
often report only the latter because of their resource constraints (Silver 2007).
In China, however, the situation is more serious. The Chinese government does not
compile survey-based trade price indices, nor does it report GDP deators disaggregated
by demand and supply components. Although it began reporting unit export and import
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value indices in 2005, it will be many years until researchers can start using these deators
for time-series research. There area a few other East Asian countries in which consistent
trade price indices are not available for a su¢ ciently long period of time (Table 1).
The lack of o¢ cial trade price indices may be eschewed in several ways. The crudest
but easiest method is simply to use nominal trade values as surrogates for the real values,
hoping that doing so would not distort statistical investigation (e.g. Wang et al. 2003). A
slightly more sophisticated method is to approximate the volume of trade using a surro-
gate deator. For example, Kwack et al. (2007) estimate the real imports of 30 industrial
and developing countries by deating their nominal imports by the CPI of the United
States. Similarly, in their assessment of the potential impact of an RMB revaluation on
the exports of China, Rahman and Thorbecke (2007) compute the countrys real exports
by deating its nominal exports with the US CPI, the US price index for imports from
non-industrial countries1 and the export unit value index of Hong Kong. While a small
number of studies calculate their own deators, these deators are generally based on rel-
atively aggregated trade statistics and should also be regarded as approximate indicators
(e.g. Cerra and Saxena 2003).
Although a few authors voice concern about the use of surrogate deators (Marquez
and Schindler 2007), they fall short of examining how these deators deviate from the
(unknown) genuine deators and how their discrepancies a¤ect statistical investigation.
As discussed below, however, this is an issue that needs to be taken seriously when the
focus of research is on China and other East Asian countries.
Let us suppose that the true export price index pXi;t in (1) is unknown and that the
researcher uses a proxy deator pi;t = p
X
i;t  "i;t, where "i;t is the discrepancy between the
two indices. Then the implicit volume index also deviates from the true real exports:
qi;t = v
X
i;t   pi;t = qXi;t + "i;t: (2)
Now suppose that the researcher investigates the determinants of the exports of coun-
try i. A typical export function has as its arguments a variable representing the business
cycle of importer countries (yt), the relative price or real exchange rate variable (si;t),
1While the United States reports export and import deators disaggregated by partner countries,
the series for China became available only in December 2003. Although Rahman and Thorbecke argue
that the US import price index (IPI) for non-industrial countries closely matches that for China, this
does not appear to be the case.
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and a vector of other variables (Zi;t),
qXi;t = f (yt; si;t;Zi;t) : (3)
If country i is an East Asian country concerned about losing export markets to China,
Chinas exports may enter (3) as an element of Zi;t. If the researcher estimates this
equation using the approximate export volume in (2), the empirical model will be
qi;t = f
 
yt; si;t; q

c;t

; (4)
which is equivalent to
qXi;t + "i;t = f
 
yt; si;t; q
X
c;t + "c;t

; (5)
where subscript c denotes China.
As is evident from (5), estimating (4) will not nd a correct relationship between qXi;t
and qXc;t when "i;t and "c;t are correlated. Will "i;t and "c;t be correlated? To consider this
question, it should be noted rst that the exports of several Asian countries, including
China, are heavily concentrated in electronic goods whose trading volumes and prices
tend to change rapidly (Table 2). Moreover, because of increasing production sharing
in the region, their exports and imports include a substantial amount of intermediate
electronics whose prices are particularly unstable, such as semiconductors. To the extent
that this is the case, when qi;t and q

c;t are computed using the US CPI or PPI, not only
will "i;t and "c;t become numerically large but will also be positively correlated with each
other.2
In order to assess the importance of this problem, we have computed original unit
export value indices for nine Asian countries, including China. Our unit value index
is based on detailed product-level trade statistics obtained from the United Nations
COMTRADE database and computed as a chained Fisher index so as to minimize an
aggregation bias.3 We have also computed a unit value index for electronic goods that
are traded in the international market, including those involving East Asian and other
countries, using data from 36 countries and following the same compilation method as
2While country i may report its export price index, one would like to use the same type of deators
for country i and China when estimating an equation like (5). This is why the existing literature often
adopts the US CPI, PPI, and import/export prices indices as a common deator when estimating trade
equations for a large number of countries.
3 Kuroko (2007) explaines the computation method. Taiwans data was obtained from country
sources.
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in the case of the country unit export value index. Figure 1 plots the year-on-year
rates of change in the computed unit export value index and the corresponding export
volume index for China, ANIES4 (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), ASEAN4
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) and world electronics trade, along
with those of the US PPI and the US non-petroleum IPI.
A few ndings are worth noting here. First, the export prices of China and other
East Asian countries are correlated with each other and appear to be inuenced by the
international prices of electronic products. Second, although the US PPI and IPI are also
correlated with the unit values of the exports of the Asian countries and world electronics
trade, the correlation is not perfect, with the latter being much more volatile. Third, not
only is the electronics volume index positively correlated with the electronic price index
(not surprising since a slowdown in demand is likely to depress prices), but the former
is also correlated with the export volumes of the Asian countries. These observations
suggest that the adoption of a broad-based proxy deator such as the US PPI or IPI
will not only make "i;t and "c;t correlated but also strengthen the estimation bias in (4)
through their positive correlations with qXi;t and q
X
c;t.
It is also worth noticing that the volume of world electronics trade is not driven solely
by the business cycles of importer countries. In the upper panel of Figure 2, we replot
the growth rate of our electronics volume index along with those of global real GDP and
the real GDP of advanced countries. Although their time series are clearly correlated,
the former is much more volatile and has occasionally moved in the direction opposite
to the latter. This implies that the demand for electronics goods is not merely more
income elastic than other types of products but also subject to factors that are specic
to this industry. This in turn suggests that the export demand equation (3) should
either be estimated separately for electronics and other goods, or explicitly control for
the dynamics of the international electronics market, for otherwise the estimated income
elasticity would become implausibly large and/or unstable over time. This is indeed what
the existing studies report for China and a few other East Asian countries (Aziz et al.
2007).
Let us return to the general export function (3) and suppose that we are now interested
in the price elasticity of exports, i.e., the elasticity of qXi;t to si;t. For the sake of exposition,
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we dene si;t as follows:
si;t =
X
j
wj;ts
j
i;t =
X
j 6=i
wj;t
 
eji;t + pj;t   pi;t

;
X
j 6=i
wj;t = 1; (6)
where eji;t is the nominal bilateral exchange rate (units of country i currency per unit of
country j currency), pi;t is the cost of production index (e.g., the unit labor cost or the
PPI), and wj;t is the weight attached to the currency of country j. If we rewrite e
j
i;t in
terms of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, (6) becomes
si;t = e
$
i;t  
X
j 6=i
wj;te
$
j;t +
X
j 6=i
wj;tpj;t   pi;t; (7)
where $ denotes the United States.
Now suppose that country i is China. Since China keeps the nominal RMB/dollar ex-
change rate very stable, the rst term on the right-hand side of (7) is e¤ectively constant.
If the cost of production in each country also changes only slowly, (3) would e¤ectively
become
qi;t = q
X
i;t + "i;t = f
 
yt; e$1;t; e$2;t; e$3;t; :::

; (8)
where e$1;t; e
$
2;t; ::: are the exchange rates of the currencies of Chinas trade partners,
including other East Asian countries, vis-à-vis the US dollar. Although certain Asian
currencies are pegged to the dollar as tightly as the RMB, others are not. The prime
example of the latter is the Japanese yen, which has been subject to large medium-term
swings against the dollar during the past three decades. This implies that estimating (3)
would not nd the correct price elasticity of Chinas exports if "i;t is correlated with the
yen/dollar exchange rate. The same argument holds if country i is not China but other
Asian countries whose currencies are closely linked to the dollar, such as Hong Kong and
Malaysia.
But why should "i;t be correlated with the yen/dollar exchange rate? To understand
why, rst note that Japan is a major exporter of electronics, although its export basket
is more diversied than those of other Asian countries.4 Moreover, since large Japanese
electronics rms have extensive production networks in China and Southeast Asia, these
rms are responsible for part of the electronics trade of these countries. If the Japanese
rms x their prices in terms of yen or at least do not fully adjust them to exchange
4 In value terms, however, Japan had long been the largest exporter of electronics in the world, until
its position was overtaken by China in 2003.
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rate movements, a large yen depreciation will lower their prices measured in dollars.
This implies that the nominal yen/dollar exchange rate is negatively correlated with our
electronics unit value index and hence also with "i;t. The lower panel of Figure 2 clearly
conrms this expectation.5
The previous observation suggests that estimating (8) would make us believe that a
yen depreciation exerts very strong competitive pressures on the exporters of China and
other dollar-pegging countries, even if this is not true. Although a number of existing
studies indeed make such a claim (Ito et al. 1998; Wang et al. 2003), their results are
often not robust to changes in deators and the inclusion of a variable that controls for
shocks specic to the electronics industry (Kumakura 2005, 2007a). Note that while it is
possible that a yen depreciation boosts the price competitiveness of Japanese producers
and helps them expand their exports, such e¤ects should unfold gradually, with at least
certain time lags. However, the existing studies often nd the e¤ect of a yen depreciation
on the exports of other countries as immediate and short-lived (e.g., Doraisami 2004).
There are other channels through which the dynamics of the electronics industry can
distort the estimated price elasticity of exports. In (8), suppose that i = 1; 2; 3; ::: are not
Japan but other Asian countries, such as Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, whose currencies
are tied to the dollar less tightly than the RMB. These countries rely particularly heavily
on the electronics industry and, while not recognized widely, have a tendency to let their
currencies depreciate when their export performance deteriorates sharply (Kumakura
2005, 2007a). This implies that when the growth rate of the value of world electronics
trade decelerates as a result of, say, a collapse of semiconductor prices or a slowdown
of the downstream IT industry, falls in qXi;t and "i;t and rises in e
$
1;t, e
$
2;t, e
$
3;t; ::: may
take place simultaneously, forcing the variables on the right and left sides of (8) to move
in the same direction.6 Since China relies heavily on imported inputs for electronics
production, its aggregate exports and imports tend to move together, particularly when
the world electronics market becomes turbulent (Kumakura 2006). This implies that if
one estimates Chinas export and import functions without recognizing the dynamics of
the electronics industry, the price elasticity of the former may be biased upward while
that of the latter may be downwardly biased. A number of existing studies indeed nd
5 The correlation coe¢ cient for the yen/dollar rate and the world electronics price is  0:549.
6 In the lower panel of Figure 2, the correlation between the composite ANIES/dollar exchange rate
and our electronics price and value indices are 0:610 and 0:625, respectively.
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an implausibly large price elasticity for Chinas exports and a small or wrongly-signed
price elasticity for its imports (Cheung et al. 2007). Note also that this bias will work in
the opposite direction if the country in focus is not China but countries whose currencies
tend to depreciate against the dollar when a negative shock occurs to the electronics
market.
3 An illustration
We next illustrate the quantitative importance of the previous issues in terms of a specic
example. In a series of papers, Alan Ahearne, John Fernald and their coauthors assess
the competitive impact of Chinas exports on other Asian countries (Ahearne et al. 2003,
2006; Fernald and Loungani 2004). They do so by estimating the following variant of
(4):
qi;t = i +
X
k=0
kyi;t k +
X
k=0
ksi;t k +
X
k=0
kq

c;t k + :::; (9)
where  is the rst-di¤erence operator, i = 1; 2; :::; 8 are ANIES4 and ASEAN4, and i is
the country xed e¤ect. Using annual data for 1981 onward, Ahearne et al. estimate this
equation for a panel of (a) ANIES4, (b) ASEAN4 and (c) all eight East Asian countries
(EA8). In all of these panels, the estimated coe¢ cients on qc;t are positive and highly
signicant. On the basis of this result, Ahearne et al. (2006) argue that the exports of
China and other Asian countries are more complementary than widely believed and have
the potential for growing together without hurting each other.
There are doubts about this result, however. Although both Ahearne et al. (2003)
and Ahearne et al. (2006) call qi;t and q

c;t real exports, the former do not mention
how the nominal values are deated, and the real exports in the latter are in fact
nominal exports measured in local currency. Moreover, their result contradicts those of
other recent studies, such as Eichengreen et al. (2007). According to Eichengreen et
al., relatively high-income ANIES4 gain from the export and economic growth of China
because their competitive loss in third countries is more than fully compensated for by
an increase in their exports to China. In ASEAN4 and other low-income Asian countries,
however, the net impact of Chinas export growth is negative because the former e¤ect
dominates the latter.
Nevertheless, the di¤erence between the results of Ahearne et al. (2003, 2007) and
Eichengreen et al. (2007) is in fact more apparent than real. To demonstrate this, we rst
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reestimate (9) by computing qi;t and q

c;t by deating nominal US-dollar export values
with the US PPI.7 yi;t is computed as the weighted average of the real GDP growth
rates of the United States, Japan, and the six largest European countries, where the
weight is the share of each country in the exports of country i during the previous year.
The real e¤ective exchange rate is computed against the currencies of 24 trade partner
countries using each countrys PPI as pi;t. The currency weight wj;t takes account of
export competition in third countries and trade in intermediate products that may be
re-exported to third countries as part of nal or more advanced intermediate goods.8 We
only use annual data for 1987-2005 due to the lack of disaggregated trade data for earlier
years. Following Ahearne et al. (2006), we also consider specications that allow the
coe¢ cient on Chinas exports to change after 2001, so as to examine the possibility that
its competitive pressures on other Asian countries have strengthened after its entry into
the WTO.
The result of this estimation, presented in Table 3, is qualitatively similar to those of
Ahearne et al. (2003, 2006). In particular, the coe¢ cients on Chinese exports are positive
and highly signicant, except when di¤erent coe¢ cients are permitted for 1987-2000 and
2001-2005 in the panel of ASEAN4. This result is robust to the inclusion of a lagged
regressand and a dummy variable for the period of the Asian crisis.
In Table 3, however, there are a few anomalies. First, most of the estimated coe¢ -
cients on yi;t range between 2 and 3 which, albeit not implausible, appear rather large.
Second, the coe¢ cients on the real exchange rate variables have the wrong sign, although
they are generally statistically insignicant.
We next conduct the same estimation by replacing qi;t and q

c;t with the growth
rates of the export values deated with our unit value indices. The result is presented
in Table 4 and di¤ers considerably from that in Tables 3. First of all, the coe¢ cients on
the exchange rates are of the expected sign and (close to being) statistically signicant
at the ten percent level. Second, the coe¢ cients on Chinas exports are estimated more
imprecisely, with much smaller point estimates. Most importantly, the general t of the
model is substantially poorer than in Table 3, suggesting that the previous regressions
7 Deating dollar-denominated export values with the US CPI or IPI, or deating local-currency
export values with the home-country CPI or PPI, does not materially change the following result. All
variables used below pass standard panel unit root tests with ying colors.
8 The former adjustment utilizes the method of the Federal Reserve Board as in Ahearne et al. (2006).
The latter adjustment is described in Kumakura (2007b). We also follow Ahearne et al. and conduct
adjustment for Chinas pre-1994 dual exchange rates.
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were to a large extent spurious. These ndings are consistent with our discussion in
Section 2.
Nevertheless, if there is a merit in our previous discussion, (9) is still misspecied
because it does not take account of shocks specic to the electronics industry. Since the
exposure to the electronics market varies across countries, we dene the following control
variable
qeli;t = (Share of electronics in the total exports of country i in year t  1)qelt ;
(10)
where qelt is the log rst di¤erence of our volume index for the global electronics trade.
We next add this variable and reestimate (9).9
The result is presented in Table 5. The electronics variable is indeed highly signicant
in all regressions. When this variable is included, moreover, the estimated coe¢ cients
on the foreign income variable range in the neighborhood of unity, suggesting large dif-
ferences in the income elasticities between electronics and other products.10 Second, the
coe¢ cients on Chinese exports are even smaller than in Table 4 and have a negative sign
for ASEAN4. Although the Chinese variables are statistically signicant only in a few
cases, there is now little qualitative di¤erence from what is reported by Eichengreen et
al. (2007).11
9 Since the Asian countries collectively account for a sizable share of the world electronics trade,
qelt is strictly speaking not exogenous to the regressand in (9). To address this issue, we have created
an alternative variable by computing qelt in terms of the rate of change in the real global shipment
of semiconductors, which includes each countrys domestic sales and should be less susceptible to the
endogeneity problem. Using this variable in the computation of qeli;t only strengthens the following
result.
10 The weak signicance of yi;t in Table 5 reects its correlation with the electronics variable. However,
the fact that only the latter is signicant in most cases suggests that the dynamics of the world electronics
market have more direct impact on the export performance of (at least some) East Asian countries.
11 As far as we understand, the result of Eichengreen et al. (2007) di¤ers from that of Ahearne et
al. not because the former use a correct price index but because they estimate their model using an
instrumental variable (IV) method. More specically, Eichengeen et al. estimate the following augmented
gravity equation
qij;t = i + yi;t + yj;t:::+ q

cj;t + :::;
where qij;t and q

cj;t refer to the exports of country i and China to country j. Eichengreen et al.
instrument qcj;t with the distance between China and country j to control for its potential endogeneity
with qij;t. While this time-invariant instrument seems rather ine¢ cient, it makes considerable di¤erence
in the estimated coe¢ cient on qcj;t ( Eichengreen et al. 2007: 213). However, Eichengreen et al. deate
all bilateral trade with the US CPI for all urban consumers, which is unlikely to be a sensible choice.
Moreover, although they also estimate an import equation for China, they do not employ the IV method
for this equation.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has discussed the problems arising from the use of a surrogate price index for
research in the trade of China and other East Asian countries. An inappropriate deator
causes a serious estimation bias because of the heavy dependence of a number of Asian
countries on electronic products, the distinct dynamics of the electronics industry, and
their subtle interaction with the exchange rates of certain Asian currencies. Although
the estimation in Section 3 did not directly examine Chinas trade dynamics, the result
raises questions about the existing literature on this subject as well.12
Now the question is: what should we do then? Since our unit value indices are
only available at the annual frequency, they are of limited use for detailed time-series
analysis.13 Ideally, therefore, the governments of China and a few other countries should
be prodded to extend their unit export and import value indices to at least the mid-1990s
and make them publicly available at the monthly or quarterly frequencies. Given the
known di¢ culties of unit trade value indices (Silver 2007), the Chinese government should
also start considering the compilation of aggregate price indices based on establishment
price surveys.
Until this is done, researchers will have to continue relying on proxy deators. Nev-
ertheless, our analysis suggests that broad-based price indices, such as the CPI, PPI, or
a general import or export price index of a particular foreign country, are unlikely to
provide a good substitute. One possibility would be to rst generate industry-specic
approximate deators using the disaggregated price indices of a large number of foreign
countries and aggregate them in accordance with the composition of the export and im-
port baskets of China and other countries for which the relevant price indices are lacking
(Aziz and Li 2007). Another possibility would be to estimate trade functions separately
for electronics and other products, although one must recognize the fact that intermedi-
ate electronic goods are now used increasingly widely as an input to other industries as
well. Lastly, it would also be useful, as is done in this paper, to make prior conjectures
about various biases arising from the use of a particular proxy deator and to carefully
examine the estimation result in light of such conjectures.
12 See Kumakura (2006: Appendix) for an analysis of the recent dynamics of Chinas imports and
exports and their relationship between the condition of the electronics industry.
13 This is the only frequency at which product-level trade statistics are compiled by the United Nations
and other international agencies.
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Table 1. Availability of aggregate export and import deflators (1987-) 
Price index 1)
IMF 2) UN 3) WTO 4) IMF 2)
China × × × ×
Indonesia ○ ○ × ×
Hong Kong ○ ○ ○ ×
Japan ○ ○ ○ ○
Korea ○ ○ ○ ○
Malaysia △ △ × ×
Philippines △ △ ○ △
Singapore ○ ○ ○ ○
Taiwan × × ○ ×
Thailand ○ ○ ○ ×
(Notes) ○ = Available. △= Available for some years. ×= Not available. 1) Survey-based aggregate price indices. 2)
International Financial Statistics (CD-ROM). 3) Online Common Database
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_help/cdb_quick_start.asp). 4) Online Statistical Database
(http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramHome.aspx?Language=E).
Unit value index
Country
 
 
 
Table 2. Share of electronics in the exports of East Asian countries 
1987 1995 2005 1987 1995 2005
China 3.0 12.0 32.8 0.6 5.4 12.6
Hong Kong 3 15.8 23.7 21.4 8.6 21.1 13.6
Indonesia 0.1 5.4 9.8 0.1 1.8 4.4
Japan 25.0 27.7 20.1 9.7 17.7 14.8
Korea 19.8 28.2 32.9 7.6 19.0 19.5
Malaysia 21.6 46.7 48.6 17.9 29.9 29.9
Philippines 4 8.8 17.1 60.8 8.3 12.1 49.5
Singapore 32.8 57.8 53.1 16.5 31.6 39.7
Taiwan 20.1 5 32.6 39.4 6 8.7 5 21.2 28.1 6
Thailand 6.9 23.4 25.4 6.7 13.7 13.6
(Source) UN COMTRADE, Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports in Taiwan Area, R.O.C.
All electronics 1 Parts and components 2
Country
(Notes) 1 SITC (Rev.2) 75, 76, 771, 772, 774 and 776. 2 SITC 759, 7649, 771, 772 and 776. 3 Excludes re-exports.
4 Excludes consignment exports recorded on SITC 9310. 5 1989. 6 Vale for 2003.
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Table 3. Impact of China’s exports on other East Asian countries (1) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
∆yi   2.525***   3.179***   1.834***   2.543***   2.944***   2.124**   2.485***   3.239***   1.592*
 (0.651)  (0.788)  (0.668) (0.935) (0.997) (0.975) (0.922)  (1.177)  (0.922)
Lag 1 - 1.699* - 2.226* - 1.082
 (0.882) (1.167)  (1.296)
∆si - 0.158* - 0.119 - 0.183** - 0.201 - 0.280 - 0.203 - 0.113 - 0.106 - 0.161
 (0.096)  (0.101)  (0.093) (0.175) (0.168) (0.174) (0.119)  (0.132)  (0.113)
Lag 1 - 0.016  0.269 - 0.159
 (0.102) (0.176)  (0.134)
∆qc
*   0.409***   0.277***   0.562***   0.399***   0.252***   0.107
 (0.063)  (0.104) (0.081) (0.124) (0.094)  (0.162)
Lag 1   0.061  0.179** - 0.045
 (0.065) (0.077)  (0.100)
∆qc
*   0.485***   0.605***   0.362***
[1987-2000]  (0.066)  (0.086)  (0.097)
∆qc
*   0.242***   0.462***   0.023
[2001-2005]  (0.081)  (0.107)  (0.118)
D.W.   1.656   1.693   1.875  2.111  2.073  2.262  1.415   1.397   1.698
R2 (adj.)   0.388   0.328   0.425   0.550   0.542   0.557   0.153   0.076   0.241
EA8 ANIES4 ASEAN4
(Notes) Panel estimation with country fixed effects. The dependent variable and ∆qc* are the year-on-year growth
rate of each country's nominal exports deflated by the US PPI. Common and country-specific intercepts are not
reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. Exports of Hong Kong exclude re-exports.
Explanatory
variable
 
 
Table 4. Impact of China’s exports on other East Asian countries (2) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
∆yi   2.081**   2.460**   1.802**   2.431**   2.941**   2.375*   1.975   1.896   1.513
 (0.887)  (1.048)  (0.929) (1.182) (1.296) (1.244) (1.337)  (1.666)  (1.393)
Lag 1 - 0.783 - 2.452   0.698
 (1.243) (1.593)  (1.946)
∆si   0.219*   0.316**   0.208   0.349   0.260   0.348   0.200   0.285   0.173
 (0.131)  (0.139)  (0.132) (0.224) (0.222) (0.225) (0.173)  (0.195)  (0.174)
Lag 1   0.229*   0.356   0.153
 (0.138) (0.231)  (0.192)
∆qc   0.209**   0.209   0.389***   0.164   0.028   0.206
 (0.094)  (0.165) (0.113) (0.193) (0.150)  (0.270)
Lag 1   0.044   0.140 - 0.062
 (0.098) (0.113)  (0.152)
∆qc   0.238**   0.394***   0.080
[1987-2000]  (0.098)  (0.118)  (0.156)
∆qc   0.129   0.374** - 0.118
[2001-2005]  (0.124)  (0.149)  (0.196)
D.W.   2.099   2.177   2.128  2.250  2.161  2.256  2.061   2.133   2.107
R2 (adj.)   0.176   0.189   0.176   0.341   0.360   0.332   0.033   0.004   0.037
EA8 ANIES4 ASEAN4
Explanatory
variable
(Notes) See Table 3. The dependent variable and ∆qc are the year-on-year growth rate of each country's nominal
exports deflated with our unit export value index.  
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Table 5. Impact of China’s exports on other East Asian countries (3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆yi   1.486*   1.269   0.690   0.714   1.592   1.060   1.068   0.782   1.552   1.450   0.561   0.651
 (0.897)  (0.960) (0.962)  (0.998) (1.234) (1.337) (1.350) (1.406) (1.339)  (1.440)  (1.407) (1.475)
∆qi
el   0.974***   1.097**   1.272***   1.252***   0.975**   1.208*   1.164**   1.278**   0.956*   1.040   1.355**   1.297**
 (0.370)  (0.450) (0.392)  (0.454) (0.494) (0.622) (0.532) (0.634) (0.546)  (0.669)  (0.573) (0.670)
∆si   0.192   0.250*   0.158   0.230*   0.297   0.256   0.281   0.247   0.175   0.210   0.118   0.172
 (0.129)  (0.136) (0.128)  (0.135) (0.221) (0.221) (0.221) (0.222) (0.171)  (0.191)  (0.170) (0.188)
Lag 1   0.182   0.185   0.385*   0.393*   0.070   0.060
 (0.134)  (0.133)  (0.223)  (0.224)  (0.188)  (0.185)
∆qc   0.161*   0.070   0.340***   0.125 - 0.019 - 0.047
 (0.094)  (0.150) (0.113) (0.181) (0.150)  (0.250)
∆qc   0.208**   0.167   0.365***   0.166   0.053   0.107
[1987-2000] (0.095)  (0.157) (0.116) (0.192)  (0.152) (0.258)
∆qc - 0.031 - 0.048   0.234   0.073 - 0.296* - 0.247
[2001-2005]  (0.129)  (0.162)  (0.159)  (0.198)  (0.204)  (0.267)
D.W.   2.048   2.097  2.108   2.153  2.159  2.036  2.189  2.045  2.031   2.057   2.125  2.176
R2 (adj.)   0.210   0.226   0.229   0.241   0.368   0.369   0.367   0.363   0.061   0.052   0.098   0.088
(Notes) See Table 3. See text for the definition of ∆qi
el.
EA8 ANIES4 ASEAN4
Explanatory
variable
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 Figure 1. Exports of East Asian countries and global trade in electronics 
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(Notes) All values are measured in terms of the rate of change over the previous year. The top 
three panels concern the aggregate exports of the respective (group of) countries. The series for 
ANIES4 and ASEAN4 are computed as the weighted average of those of individual countries, 
where the weight is the relative size of their exports in the previous year. The bottom panel plots 
changes in the unit value and volume indices for world trade in electronic products (SITC 75, 76, 
771, 772, 774, 776).  
(Source) IMF International Financial Statistics, UN COMTRADE and Taiwan customs data. 
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Figure 2. World electronics trade and Asian currencies 
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(Notes) All values refer to the rate of change over the previous year. Exchange rate (ANIES/dollar) is the rate 
of change in the weighted average of the nominal exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar of the Korean won, 
the Singapore dollar and the Taiwan dollar, where the weight is the relative size of the exports of each 
country in the previous year. Positive values in the exchange rate series indicate an appreciation vis-à-vis the 
US dollar. 
(Source) IMF IFS, CEIC Asia Database, UN COMTRADE and Taiwan customs data. 
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